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Sexual abuse has been a much publicised issue in Australia recently, particularly in the 
context of schools and churches. A very recent decision of the High Court of Australia has 
considered two grounds upon which an education authority might be held liable for acts of 
sexual abuse committed by teachers against students: the non-delegable duty of care owed 
by an education authority and the principle of vicarious liability which governs whether an 
employer can be liable for the wrongs done by employees. In the judgment, some members 
of the High Court draw parallels between how the two grounds of liability might apply in 
the context of sexual abuse by teachers at schools and how they might apply in the context 
of sexual abuse by employees in institutions such as nursing homes, old people’s homes, 
geriatric wards and daycare centres. The decision therefore raises important questions for 
those who are involved in the allied health industry. 
Introduction 
Sexual abuse has been a much publicised issue in 
Australia during the past decade. Media reports about 
sexual abuse committed against children in particular 
have been common, and there has been much critical 
comment about how various religious and educational 
authorities have managed – or, indeed, have failed to 
manage – the problem. It is not surprising, then, that 
some of the victims of sexual abuse inevitably turn to 
the courts in their quest for a remedy, including 
financial compensation. 
 
The problem of sexual abuse is not, however, the 
exclusive domain of schools, nor of some churches. 
The risk of sexual abuse of other vulnerable people, 
such as the infirm and elderly in institutions such as 
nursing homes and geriatric wards, is also an abhorrent 
reality. In the recent English court case of Lister & Ors 
v Hesley Hall Limited 1  (Lister’s case) in which the 
employer of a warden of a residential boarding annex 
for children with emotional and behavioural difficulties 
was sued for financial compensation for acts of 
intentional sexual abuse committed by the warden 
against a number of the children, one of the judges 
commented: 
                                                 
                                                                           
1 [2001] 2 All ER 769; [2001] UKHL 22 (3 May 2001). For a 
discussion of Lister, see P Giliker, ‘Rough Justice in an 
Unjust World’ (2002) 65 The Modern Law Review 269-
279; A Knott, ‘School Liability for Intentional Wrongs – 
Trends and Significance’ (2002) 8 ANZELA Reporter 3-
16; P Williams, ‘Case Note – Lister & Others v Hesley 
Hall Limited [2001] 2 All ER 769; [2001] UKHL 22 (3 
May 2001)’ (2001) 6 (1 & 2) Australia & New Zealand 
Journal of Law & Education 101-106. 
 
Experience shows that in the case of boarding 
schools, prisons, nursing homes, old people’s 
homes, geriatric wards, and other residential 
homes for the young or vulnerable, there is an 
inherent risk that indecent assaults on the 
residents will be committed by those placed in 
authority over them, particularly if they are in 
close proximity to them and occupying a 
position of trust.2 
 
In the case, the House of Lords, the highest court in 
England, decided that the employer of the warden 
could be held liable for the intentional acts of the 
2 Per Lord Millett at 800. 
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warden on the basis of the principle of vicarious 
liability (see below).  
 
As coincidence would have it, the High Court of 
Australia has also recently examined the legal 
principles upon which liability might be sheeted home 
to an employer of an employee who has committed 
acts of sexual abuse against another. In New South 
Wales v Lepore; Samin v Queensland; Rich v 
Queensland3 (the Lepore, Samin and Rich cases), two 
grounds of liability were examined by the High Court: 
the nature and content of the non-delegable duty of 
care owed by an education authority to students 
entrusted to its care (see below), and the liability of an 
education authority, as employer, for wrongs 
committed by an employee against students, commonly 
known as vicarious liability (see below). While each of 
the three cases involved acts of sexual abuse 
committed by a teacher against children attending 
schools, at least two members of the High Court 
expressed the view that the grounds of liability raised 
by the cases could extend to situations where acts of 
sexual abuse had been committed against persons other 
than students, by persons other than teachers. In his 
examination of vicarious liability for example, one 
member of the High Court commented: 
 
It could not be supposed that a legal principle 
of vicarious liability expressed to apply to 
cases of physical and sexual assaults upon 
pupils could be confined to teachers. 
Depending on the circumstances, any such 
principle might extend to the clergy, to 
scoutleaders and to daycare workers. It might 
also have to extend to employers of 
gynaecologists, psychiatrists and university 
tutors. Nor would it easily be confined to 
potential victims who were school pupils. It 
might expand to other groups vulnerable to 
physical and sexual abuse, including the old, 
the mentally ill, the incarcerated, the feeble 
and so on … 4 
                                                 
                                                
3 (2003) 77 ALJR 558; [2003] HCA 4 (6 February 2003). In 
the case, the High Court was hearing three separate 
appeals together. Lepore’s case was an appeal against a 
decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, while 
the Samin and Rich cases were appeals against decisions of 
the Queensland Court of Appeal. For comments on the 
High Court’s judgment, see A Knott & D Stewart, Schools 
Alert, ‘Vicarious Liability under the High Court 
Microscope’ (2003) 2 CCH  3-4; R Price, Industrial Law 
News, ‘A New High Court Policy for Vicarious Liability?’ 
(2003) 5 CCH 5-6. 
 
And in his examination of the non-delegable duty of 
care, another member of the High Court commented: 
 
[I]ts significance extends beyond schools, and 
beyond activities involving the care of 
children. The ambit of the duties that are 
regarded as non-delegable has never been 
defined, and the extent of potential tort 
liability involved is uncertain, but it is clearly 
substantial.5 
 
The Lepore, Samin and Rich cases thus raise important 
questions for those employers and employees in the 
allied health industry. This article explores some of 
those questions. 
 
The Lepore, Samin and Rich cases 
In the Lepore case, at the age of seven years and while 
attending a state primary school, Lepore was sexually 
and physically assaulted by his male teacher on a 
number of separate occasions. On being accused of 
misbehaviour, the student had been sent to a storeroom 
where he was told by the teacher to remove his 
clothing. He was then smacked and indecently touched 
by the teacher. On some occasions, other boys were 
also present. He sued the teacher, as well as the NSW 
Education Department as the employer of the teacher, 
for financial compensation. Following the initial 
findings and decision of the trial court, Lepore 
appealed to the NSW Court of Appeal on the ground 
that the trial court had not addressed the issue of the 
non-delegable duty of care owed by the NSW 
Education Department. 6  The NSW Court of Appeal 
held that the education authority was liable for breach 
of its non-delegable duty of care owed to its students to 
 
4 Per Kirby J at 617. 
5 Per Gleeson CJ at 561. In addition see his comments at 567-
568.  
6 For an account of the trial judge’s findings, see the 
judgment of Gleeson CJ in the Lepore, Samin and Rich 
cases at 561-562, or that of Gaudron J at 576-577. 
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ensure that they were not injured physically by an 
employed teacher, whether acting negligently or 
intentionally. 7  The NSW Education Department 
appealed to the High Court against the decision. 
 
In the Samin and Rich cases, both Samin and Rich had, 
on a number of occasions, been sexually assaulted by 
the teacher in a one-teacher government primary 
school in rural Queensland. The sexual assaults had 
taken place during school hours and in a classroom or 
adjoining rooms. Both students sued for financial 
compensation, alleging that the teacher had sexually 
assaulted them at school and that this amounted to a 
breach of the non-delegable duty of care owed to them 
by the Minister for Education and the State of 
Queensland as the education authority concerned. The 
trial court gave judgment for the students,8 holding that 
the duty owed to the students was non-delegable and 
that breach of that duty would be established simply if 
the assaults by the teacher were proved. The Minister 
and the State of Queensland successfully appealed to 
the Queensland Court of Appeal where the court held 
that breach of the non-delegable duty of care owed by 
an education authority was not established simply by 
proving the assaults. 9  The plaintiffs appealed to the 
High Court. 
 
In the three cases before the High Court, the primary 
argument was that by virtue of the non-delegable duty 
of care owed by an education authority, the education 
authorities concerned were liable in negligence simply 
upon proof that the assaults alleged by the students had 
occurred and that the students had thereby suffered 
damage for which they should be financially 
compensated. In all three cases it was also argued that 
in view of recent court decisions in Canada and 
England, the students should also be entitled to argue 
their cases on the basis that the education authorities as 
employers could be held liable for the actions of the 
teachers pursuant to the principle of vicarious liability. 
These quite distinct arguments thus gave the High 
Court, the highest court in Australia, the opportunity to 
examine in some detail the nature and extent of the so-
called non-delegable duty of care as well as the 
principles governing vicarious liability. 
 
The non-delegable duty of care 
Where a person (commonly called the defendant) is 
sued by another person (commonly known as the 
plaintiff) for a claim in negligence, essential to 
establishing the claim against the defendant is the 
element of fault. In the Lepore, Samin and Rich cases, 
the claim for breach of the non-delegable duty of care, 
which is essentially a claim in negligence, had been 
argued by the plaintiffs on the basis that the simple fact 
that they had been assaulted by an employee was 
enough to establish breach of the non-delegable duty of 
care owed to them by the Education Department as the 
education authority. In other words, liability for breach 
of the non-delegable duty of an education authority 
was not dependent upon establishing fault on the part 
of that authority. While there was disagreement in the 
decision of the High Court as to whether the liability of 
the education authorities concerned might be argued on 
the basis of breach of the non-delegable duty of care,10 
all seven justices did examine, in varying degrees, the 
principle of the non-delegable duty of care. In general 
terms, a number of propositions relating to such a duty 
seem to emerge from that examination: 
 
                                                                                                  
7 For an analysis of the decision of the NSW Court of 
Appeal, see Knott, above n 1. 
10 The entire judgment of McHugh J (584-590) is taken up 
with an examination of the non-delegable duty of care, and 
he concludes that in all three cases, breach of the non-
delegable duty of care could be argued against the 
education authorities. Kirby J at 611-612, on the other 
hand, concludes that in all three cases it was not necessary 
to resort to breach of the non-delegable duty of care in 
order to find the education authorities liable. He relies 
ultimately on the principle of vicarious liability. 
8 At trial in the District Court of Queensland, the Minister 
and the State of Queensland applied to have the statements 
of claim of the plaintiffs struck out as disclosing no cause 
of action against them. The court dismissed the strike-out 
applications.  
9 For an analysis of the decision of the Queensland Court of 
Appeal, see Knott, above n 1. 
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• It is accepted in Australian law that in some 
relationships, the duty to take care is ‘non-
delegable’ or ‘primary’.11 
• The relationships that attract this non-
delegable duty traditionally include, but are 
not necessarily limited to, master and servant, 
adjoining landowners, hospital and patient, 
and education authority and student; indeed, 
in situations where the care of vulnerable 
people, such as the elderly, the mentally 
infirm, the very young and so on, is involved, 
it is difficult to envisage a relationship that 
would not give rise to this non-delegable duty 
of care.12 
• The underlying reason for the imposition of 
the non-delegable duty of care is the 
vulnerability or special dependence of the 
person to whom the duty is owed and the 
accepting of responsibility for the safety of 
such persons by the person or organisation 
who is said to owe the duty.13 
• The duty is ‘non-delegable’ in the sense that 
the person subject to the duty has the ultimate 
and personal responsibility to perform the 
duty himself/herself or to make sure it is 
carried out; the legal obligation to provide the 
required level of care inherent in the non-
delegable duty always remains that of the 
person owing the duty, but while the duty 
itself cannot be discharged by entrusting or 
delegating the duty itself to another, others 
can be employed to carry out tasks associated 
with performing the duty.14 
• Whether the non-delegable duty is described 
as a duty ‘to ensure that reasonable care is 
taken’ or as a duty ‘to see that reasonable care 
is taken’, it is a stringent duty in the sense that 
it imposes sole responsibility for its discharge 
on the person owing the duty.15 
• The non-delegable duty does not impose strict 
liability in the sense that the person owing it 
will be automatically liable simply on proof of 
injury, accidental or intentional, incurred by 
the person to whom the duty is owed; to be 
found liable for breach of the non-delegable 
duty, there must be some fault, or failure to 
carry out the duty, or negligent conduct, 
established on the part of the person owing 
the duty that results in injury or damage to the 
person to whom the duty is owed.16  
 
The High Court essentially held that the argument 
based on the non-delegable duty of care could not be 
maintained by all three students, given that there was 
no evidence of fault on the part of the education 
authorities concerned.17  
 
Comment  
While the Lepore, Samin and Rich cases were 
concerned with the liability of education authorities for 
acts of sexual and physical abuse committed by 
teachers against students, the propositions outlined 
above do appear to raise important issues about the 
liability of a business in the allied health industry for 
acts of sexual abuse committed by an employee of the 
business against persons under the care of the business.  
                                                 
11 See, for example, Gleeson CJ at 563-564, Gaudron J at 
577-578, and Kirby J at 610-612. These three justices refer 
in particular to the High Court’s decision in The 
Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258 where 
the High Court accepted that an education authority does 
owe its students a non-delegable duty of care.                                                  
12 See, for example, Gleeson CJ at 567-568, and Gummow 
and Hayne JJ at 605. Interestingly, Gummow and Hayne JJ 
at 605 also express the caution that not all relationships 
displaying these characteristics will necessarily bring 
about the non-delegable duty of care. 
14 See, for example, Gleeson CJ at 564, and McHugh J at 
586. 
15 See, for example, Gleeson CJ at 565, and McHugh J at 
586. 
16 See, for example, Gleeson CJ at 567, Gaudron J at 578, 
McHugh J at 588-590, Gummow and Hayne JJ at 606, 
Kirby J at 619, and Callinan J at 620. 
13 See, for example, Gleeson CJ at 567-568, and Gaudron J at 
578. Callinan J at 620 agrees to a large extent with the 
views of Gleeson CJ on the matter of the non-delegable 
duty of care. 
17 McHugh J, however, held that the principle of non-
delegable duty of care could be argued in all three cases. 
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 It seems clear, then, that the non-delegable duty of care 
is managerial in nature, remaining at all times the 
personal duty of the business as employer. Essentially, 
the non-delegable duty requires a business subject to 
the duty to put in place appropriately structured and 
workable systems to make sure the risk of sexual abuse 
to those under the care of the business is minimised. To 
effectively carry out that non-delegable duty, the 
business can employ staff to carry out tasks associated 
with implementing those systems, but it is not 
sufficient for the business to simply employ staff in the 
hope there will be no sexual abuse by those employees 
– the business must take every reasonable step to put in 
place systems addressing such matters as the screening 
of potential employees and the supervision of 
employees when working, to make sure that the risk of 
sexual or physical abuse of any kind does not 
eventuate. As on-going and as constant as the duty 
might be, that is what the law requires. 
It is certainly arguable, for example, that those owning 
or operating a business in the allied health industry, 
such as a nursing home or an old persons’ home, owe a 
non-delegable duty of care to the elderly, the mentally 
infirm, the very feeble, and so on, who have been 
placed under their care and responsibility. Given the 
acknowledged risks of sexual abuse in such cases, it is 
clear that such a duty requires the business itself to put 
in place processes and procedures to minimise any 
opportunity for sexual or physical abuse by the 
employees of the business. There are suggestions in a 
number of the judgments in the Lepore, Samin and 
Rich cases about what an education authority might do, 
given its non-delegable duty of care to students. One 
such suggestion is that the authority should not only be 
careful to employ reliable, carefully screened and 
properly trained employees but should also instigate 
efficient systems for the prevention and detection of 
acts of sexual misconduct by teachers.18 Another is that 
the education authority can ‘institute systems that will 
weed out or give early warning signs of potential 
offenders; deter misconduct by having classes 
inspected without warning; … encourage teachers and 
pupils to complain to school authorities and parents 
about any signs of aberrant behaviour on the part of the 
teacher.’19 No doubt, similar suggestions could equally 
be directed at the owner or operator of a nursing home 
or old persons’ home as the case may be. Indeed, as 
onerous as it might appear, it is suggested in the 
Lepore, Samin and Rich cases that  
 
Vicarious liability 
The principle of vicarious liability states that an 
employer is liable for the torts committed by an 
employee in the course of his or her employment, even 
though the employer has done nothing wrong in the 
circumstances.21 In the allied health industry, it may be 
crucial for a victim of sexual abuse to establish 
vicarious liability since it will be the employer who 
pays the compensation rather than the employee, who 
may have no financial resources to compensate the 
victim.22 
  
In the context of sexual abuse committed by an 
employee, such as a teacher, against another, such as a 
student, the Lepore, Samin and Rich cases address two 
issues pertaining to the principle of vicarious liability: 
[a] residential institution … that does not take 
reasonable steps to institute a system such that 
its employees do not come into personal 
contact with a child or other vulnerable person 
unless supervised or accompanied by another 
adult should be held directly liable in 
negligence if abuse occurs in a situation in 
which there is neither supervision nor an 
accompanying adult.20  
 
 
                                                 
                                                 
21 See, generally, D Gardiner and F McGlone, Outline of 
Torts (2nd ed, 1998) 394-406. 
18 Per Callinan J at 620. 22 In some circumstances, the employer can seek to be 
indemnified by the employee. See, generally, Gardiner and 
McGlone, above n 21, 405-406. 
19 Per McHugh J at 590. 
20 Per Gaudron J at 582.  
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i. Because sexual abuse invariably amounts to a 
criminal offence, can an employer be held 
vicariously liable for a criminal offence 
committed by its employee? 
 
ii. Because sexual abuse committed by an 
employee would be the antithesis of any 
employee’s job, can it ever be considered to 
have occurred in the course of the employee’s 
employment? 
 
All justices of the High Court in the Lepore, Samin and 
Rich cases, with the exception of one of them, 23 
explored the principle of vicarious liability and its 
application in the three cases. It is difficult to find a 
consensus in the judgments of the six justices,24 but it 
is possible to identify two opposing viewpoints that 
emerge from the decision.  
 
Vicarious liability for a criminal offence? 
In the vast majority of cases, where an employer is 
held vicariously liable for the wrongdoing of an 
employee, the wrongdoing is a tort, i.e. a wrongdoing 
done by the employee to another, entitling that other to 
sue for financial compensation. Thus, where an 
employee has been negligent or has committed a 
battery (the voluntary application of direct force, 
whether intentional or negligent, to the person of 
another), 25  the wrongdoing is a tort for which the 
employer will be vicariously liable if the remaining 
elements of that principle are established. However, if 
the wrongdoing by the employee is a criminal 
wrongdoing rather than a tort, does the principle of 
vicarious liability apply to make the employer liable 
for the employee’s criminal conduct?  
 
One of the stances adopted in the Lapore, Samin and 
Rich cases is what might be termed the ‘narrow’ view. 
That view held: 
 
Negligent, even grossly negligent conduct is 
one thing, intentional criminal conduct is, and 
always has been altogether another … 
Nothing could be further from the due 
performance of a teacher’s duty than for him 
to molest children in his care. To make an 
employer vicariously liable for such gross and 
improper departures from the proper 
performance of a teacher’s duties as sexual 
assault and molestation are, would be to 
impose upon it a responsibility beyond 
anything that … it should reasonably bear.26  
 
On this view, because the plaintiffs had been the 
victims of a criminal act it was therefore not open to 
any of the students to argue a case on the basis of 
vicarious liability. On this view, because the 
commission of a criminal act by a teacher would be so 
far removed from his duties as an employee, vicarious 
liability cannot and should not be imposed on the 
employer on the basis of the commission of that 
criminal act. Thus, if an employee in a nursing home or 
geriatric ward, for example, was to criminally sexually 
abuse an elderly or infirm patient, as a matter of 
principle the employer would not be held vicariously 
liable for that criminal conduct.  
 
                                                 
                                                
The opposing viewpoint is what might be termed the 
‘broad’ view. In addressing the specific issue of 
whether vicarious liability can apply to criminal 
conduct of an employee, another member of the High 
Court, after reviewing past court decisions that in his 
view dealt with the issue, concluded that ‘in the face of 
so many decisions upholding vicarious liability in such 
circumstances, a general exemption from civil liability 
based on the deliberate or criminal character of the 
employee’s conduct cannot stand as good law. It is 
23 Seven justices heard the appeal. Only McHugh J based his 
decision entirely on the issue of the non-delegable duty of 
care. With reference to the Lepore case, he commented at 
590 that it was unnecessary to examine the principle of 
vicarious liability and its application in the case, given that 
‘[t]he Australian common law … has adopted a simpler 
and stricter test of liability’, viz. the non-delegable duty of 
care. 
24 See the comments of Kirby J at 612 where he 
acknowledges the diversity of opinion about vicarious 
liability in the judgments in the Lepore, Samin and Rich 
cases.  
25 Gardiner and McGlone, above n 21, 59. 26 Per Callinan J at 620-621. 
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overwhelmed by too many exceptions.’27 On this view, 
where an employee’s conduct is a criminal offence, 
that fact by itself is not a bar to the injured person’s 
seeking to argue vicarious liability. Similarly, where a 
nurse or carer employed by a nursing home criminally 
sexually abuses an elderly patient, the classification of 
that conduct as a criminal offence would not deny a 
claim for compensation by the patient under the 
principle of vicarious liability.  
It is simply not logical to describe an act of sexual 
abuse by any employee as a wrongful and unauthorised 
mode of performing an act authorised by the employer. 
But in any event, according to the narrow view 
discernible from the judgments in the Lepore, Samin 
and Rich cases, an employer can never be vicariously 
liable for an act of sexual abuse committed by an 
employee in the course of the employee’s employment: 
 
 [D]eliberate criminal misconduct lies outside, 
and indeed will lie far outside the scope or 
course of an employed teacher’s duty … 
[D]eliberate criminal conduct is not properly 
to be regarded as connected with an 
employee’s employment: it is the antithesis of 
a proper performance of the duties of an 
employee.29 
Sexual abuse and ‘in the course of employment’ 
Vicarious liability holds that an employer is liable for 
the wrongdoings of an employee if those wrongdoings 
take place in the course of the employee’s 
employment. The principles often used in determining 
the meaning and operation of the phrase ‘in the course 
of employment’ state that conduct takes place in the 
course of employment where it is -  
 
Pursuant to this view, as a matter of principle any 
criminal act, even one that in a practical sense is 
intricately connected with the very task that an 
employee was employed to do, will not amount to 
conduct in the course of employment. If a nurse or 
carer, for example, was to intentionally sexually fondle 
an elderly patient while bathing the patient as a part of 
his/her job, the employer could not be found 
vicariously liable for the criminal conduct of the nurse 
or carer simply because by definition the conduct is 
outside the course of the employee’s employment. 
 
• a wrongful act authorised by the employer, or 
• a wrongful and unauthorised mode of doing 
some act authorised by the employer.28  
 
An act of sexual abuse by an employee, whether 
classified as a criminal offence or otherwise, is a 
wrongful act by the employee and as such would 
hardly be an act authorised by an employer. It would 
therefore be an act outside the scope of the employee’s 
employment, sometimes referred to as a ‘frolic’ of the 
employee for which the employer is not liable. 
Therefore, an employer could only be vicariously 
liable for an act of sexual abuse by an employee if the 
act can be said to be ‘a wrongful and unauthorised 
mode of doing some act authorised by the employer’.  
 
 
                                                 
                                                
But according to the broad view, it might be a different 
matter. In the Lepore, Samin and Rich cases the broad 
view draws heavily on Lister’s case, the decision of the 
English House of Lords referred to above, and a 
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in which an 
employer of a childcare counsellor, working in a not-
for-profit residential home for children with 
behavioural disorders, was held vicariously liable for 
acts of sexual abuse by a counsellor against a child at 
the home.30 In the judgments of two members of the 
High Court in the Lepore, Samin and Rich cases there 27 Per Kirby J at 616. Gleeson CJ at 5745 also acknowledges 
that vicarious liability can apply to intentional criminal 
conduct of an employee. 
 28 These principles are commonly known as the Salmon 
principles and are referred to in the judgments of Gleeson 
CJ at 569, Gaudron J at 579, Gummow and Hayne JJ at 
600, and Kirby J at 614-615. 
29 Per Callinan J at 620-621. 
30 Bazley v Curry (1999) 174 DLR (4th) 71; [1999] 2 SCR 
534 (Bazley’s case). 
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is the suggestion that, given the significant new 
problem of sexual abuse and the need to provide 
victims of sexual abuse in Australia with a right to 
compensation, it is important for Australian law to 
march in step with the highest courts of England and 
Canada.31  
The broad view is reflected in the judgment of one of 
the members of the High Court when, after quoting the 
views of several members of the House of Lords who 
had introduced and applied a ‘close connection’ test in 
Lister’s case, he says: 
 
 If there is sufficient connection between what 
a particular teacher is employed to do, and 
sexual misconduct, for such misconduct fairly 
to be regarded as in the course of the teacher’s 
employment, it must be because the nature of 
the teacher’s responsibilities, and of the 
relationship with pupils created by those 
relationships, justifies that conclusion. It is 
not enough to say that teaching involves care. 
So it does; but it is necessary to be more 
precise about the nature and extent of care in 
question. Teaching may simply involve care 
for the academic development and progress of 
a student. In these circumstances, it may be … 
the school context provides a mere 
opportunity for the commission of an assault. 
However, where the teacher-student 
relationship is invested with a high degree of 
power and intimacy, the use of that power and 
intimacy to commit sexual abuse may provide 
a sufficient connection between a sexual 
assault and the employment to make it just to 
treat such contact as occurring in the course of 
employment. The degree of power and 
intimacy in a teacher-student relationship 
must be assessed by reference to factors such 
as the age of students, their particular 
vulnerability, if any, the tasks allocated to 
teachers, and the number of adults 
concurrently responsible for the care of 
students. Furthermore, the nature and 
circumstances of the sexual misconduct will 
usually be a material consideration.34 
The broad view suggests the following propositions: 
 
• A wrongdoing of an employee will be in the 
course of employment if there is a ‘sufficient 
connection’ between the specific duties and 
responsibilities assigned to the employee 
within the enterprise and the wrongdoing. 
• Relevant to determining the existence of the 
sufficient connection will be the nature of the 
teacher’s duties and responsibilities with 
respect to the victim, and the degree of power 
and intimacy in the relationship between 
teacher and victim brought about by those 
responsibilities and duties; the degree of 
power and intimacy must be assessed by 
reference to such factors as the age of 
students, their particular vulnerability, and the 
nature and circumstances of the sexual 
misconduct.32 
• The fact that the employment provides the 
opportunity or occasion for the act of sexual 
abuse is not, of itself, sufficient to establish 
the sufficient connection.33 
 
 
                                                 
                                                
Given this broad view, and because of the varying 
views expressed by other members of the High Court 
as to the principles that should determine the outcomes 
of the cases based on vicarious liability, 35  it was 
generally agreed that the three students in the Lepore, 
Samin and Rich cases should have the right to reargue 
their cases for vicarious liability at a new trial.  
31 See Kirby J at 609. In his examination of vicarious 
liability, Gleeson CJ at 568-575 also relies, to a lesser 
extent than Kirby J, on the decisions of English and 
Canadian courts. 
32 See, for example, the views of Gleeson CJ at 571-575. 
Kirby J prefers a ‘close connection’ test and ties it to the 
‘enterprise risk’ analysis proposed in Bazley’s case, above 
n 30. He also expresses the view that the ‘close 
connection’ test is always ‘a question of fact and degree’ 
and that it involves ‘value judgments and policy choices’ 
requiring an answer to the question of ‘whether, in the 
particular circumstances, it is just and reasonable to 
impose on the enterprise in question legal liability for the 
particular civil wrong done by its employee’ (at 617). 
 
 
34 Per Gleeson CJ at 574-575. 
35 An analysis of the differing views of Gaudron J, Kirby J, 
and Gummow and Hayne JJ about the principles that 
should apply to vicarious liability and its application in 
cases of sexual abuse by an employee is beyond the scope 
of this article. 
33 See, for example, Gleeson CJ at 574-575, 576, and Kirby J 
at 618. 
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Comment 
If the broad view is to be the principle that determines 
whether an act of sexual abuse by an employee occurs 
in the course of employment – and in a sense whether 
that will happen may ultimately be determined by what 
the High Court may decide in a similar case in the 
future, given the diversity of views on the issue 
expressed by the seven members of the Court in the 
Lepore, Samin and Rich cases – a number of points 
seem arguable. The fact that an employee is simply on 
the staff of a particular enterprise or business in the 
allied health industry and is thereby, in a sense, 
provided with an opportunity to commit an act of 
sexual misconduct will not mean that any act of sexual 
abuse committed by the employee takes place in the 
course of employment. So, if a person employed as the 
accounts clerk in a nursing home was to sexually abuse 
a patient at the nursing home, it is arguable that that act 
of sexual misconduct would be found not to have taken 
place in the course of the accounts clerk’s employment. 
Therefore, the employer of the accounts clerk would 
not be vicariously liable for the conduct of the accounts 
clerk.  
 
Where, however, the specific responsibilities and tasks 
allocated to an employee, such as a nurse in a nursing 
home, bring about a situation between that nurse and a 
resident where the nurse acquires a significant degree 
of power and intimacy over the resident who is 
vulnerable by reason of his/her age or physical or 
mental characteristics for example, it may well be 
arguable that an act of sexual abuse committed by the 
nurse against the resident in such circumstances could 
be said to have occurred in the course of employment. 
So where the specific responsibilities of the nurse 
include, for example, bathing the resident, a task that 
the resident is incapable of performing because of 
infirmity, an act of sexual abuse committed by the 
nurse in such circumstances may arguably be said to 
occur in the course of employment. In the Lepore case, 
one of the teacher’s assigned responsibilities was the 
maintenance of discipline. This responsibility placed 
the teacher in a position of power in relation to the 
plaintiff who, by reason of his age and fear, perhaps, at 
being ordered to remove his clothing, became a 
vulnerable party in the circumstances. The 
inappropriate administration of punishment involving 
smacking the plaintiff on his bare bottom, whether 
done from a desire for sexual gratification or as a result 
of the teacher’s sadistic leanings, arguably fell within 
the course of employment. On the other hand, if the 
conduct of the teacher was found to be so different 
from anything regarded as chastisement that it was 
nothing other than sexually predatory behaviour of the 
teacher, the behaviour would then bear no sufficient 
connection to the responsibilities of the teacher. The 
result would be that the conduct would constitute a 
frolic of the teacher for which the employer is not 
vicariously liable.36  
 
There are obvious difficulties with the meaning and 
operation of the ‘sufficient connection’ test. Whether 
there is a sufficient connection between the 
employment tasks assigned to the employee and the act 
of sexual misconduct is obviously a question of fact 
and degree. And it may be that not every place of 
employment in the allied health industry has an 
allocation of responsibilities for employees that would 
make the sufficient connection test easy to apply. But it 
is a test that attempts to address the principle of 
vicarious liability and its application to what surely is a 
problem demanding a solution. Whether it is endorsed 
and applied, or abandoned, or further defined by courts 
in future cases remains to be seen.  
 
Conclusion 
The Lepore, Samin and Rich cases provide an 
important decision of the High Court of Australia. It is 
true that the decision addresses the specific context of 
liability for acts of sexual abuse in schools. But it is 
also a case in which members of the Court make the 
                                                 
36 See the comments of Gleeson CJ at 575. 
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observation that the principles of law with which the 
case is concerned are equally important for institutions 
and businesses that take on the responsibility of caring 
for the more vulnerable members of society, such as 
the elderly, the infirm, the very young and so on.  
 
To a degree, the decision clarifies the 
meaning and content of the non-delegable 
duty of care owed by an education authority 
to students attending its schools, and it is 
difficult to see why this same duty of care 
would not apply in the case of institutions 
such as nursing homes and old people’s 
homes. The case also gave the High Court an 
opportunity to clarify the meaning and 
application of the principle of vicarious 
liability in cases involving acts of sexual 
abuse committed by teachers against students. 
But because there are some very clearly 
opposing views in the judgments as to how 
the phrase ‘in the course of employment’ 
should be interpreted, there is really no 
consensus spelling out whether, and the 
circumstances in which, it might specifically 
include sexual misconduct by an employee. 
Perhaps in a future court decision these 
questions will be definitively and clearly 
answered.
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